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Based on basic organizational theories, this paper revisits studies about
intergovernmental relationships in China and proposes a systematic explanation
framework from the perspective of the allocation mechanism of authority and
accountability. The institutional feature of government organization is unfolded
from two dimensions, authority and accountability. In China, the authority and
accountability of different hierarchies are strongly related but not clearly defined.
Theories such as “Federalism, Chinese Style” are the basis for different conditions.
The trade-off between control and incentive, specification, and coordination should
be given more consideration with optimal analyses. As the main accountability
practicing mechanism, Cadre management from upper-layer hierarchies greatly
affects the allocation mechanism between different hierarchies. However, the
tournament theory about promotion lacks vision, empirical bases, and explanation
power. This paper studies the project system from an organizational perspective
and indicates that the subcontracting form differs from regional decentralization,
which accentuates interdepartmental competition and expansion.
Keywords: Government organization, Authority, Accountability, Project systemIntroduction
The institutional structure of the state deeply influence individual behavior (North
1981; Kornai 1992; Evans 1995; McGuire and Olson 1996). One of the most intensively
studied topics is the inner structure of governmental organizations. Theories relate
these intergovernmental relationships to the overall behavior and performance of gov-
ernments. Our approach follows Max Weber’s concept of hierarchy. In organizational
economics, markets and hierarchies are the two polar modes. They contrast to each
other in autonomy (Simon 1951), property rights (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Gross-
man and Hart 1986), and incentive intensity (Williamson 1991). Scholars have pointed
out that hierarchy has three main characteristics: a low level of autonomy, employer-
owned property, and low-powered incentives; these three features are complementary
(Williamson 1991; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994). Moreover, Williamson (1991) lo-
cates hybrid modes that differ from both markets and hierarchies, being more elasticThe Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and
ndicate if changes were made.
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above are based on the analysis of economic firms and the relationships between these
firms. When talking about the intergovernmental relationships of China, the focus is
mainly on how the definition and operation of intergovernmental authority—exercising
power with legitimacy—changed through the years, and how this change engendered
the phenomenon of rapid growth while combining with social and environmental prob-
lems since China’s reforms. Economists and sociologists have attempted to answer
these questions by discussing the boundaries of different organizations.
From the perspective of authority, although local governments have limited au-
tonomy in a unitary government like China, it is fundamentally different from
federalization governments. In reality, upper-tier governments have strong incen-
tives and strong control over lower-tier governments among hierarchies. However,
neither Federalism, Chinese Style nor the administrative subcontracting model has
captured this feature. Theories should be consistently revised to fit the reality, and
the complicity of reality is a chance to test and update theories. Therefore, select-
ively applying materials to mechanically fit theories is like cutting the foot to fit
the shoe (Prendergast 1999).
On the one hand, from the perspective of authority, Montinola et al. (1995) point out
that fiscal federalism empower local governments to resist decisions from the central
government, providing the case that in 1989, Guangdong successfully resisted central
tax reform, but they ignore the change of personnel and tax-share reform (Cai and
Treisman 2006). In addition, previous literature mainly focused on relationships among
blocks (kuaikuai), while there has been little treatment of the problems of branches
(tiaotiao) beyond sociological studies. Since the mid-1990s, the mechanism of authority
and accountability between Chinese government hierarchies has changed dramatically,
with the increased authority of branches and changes in relationship among blocks.
Unfortunately, theoretical and empirical research on the current intergovernmental
relationship is limited.
From the perspective of accountability, there is no independent third party to
monitor and supervise the exercise of authority in the governmental organization. How
can governments guarantee that their power is being exercised legally and effectively?
In developing countries, the problem of accountability is as significant as the problems
of authority and influences the efficiency of governance (Bardhan 2002). There are two
basic views on the problem of governmental accountability. First, from the view of
supervision and monitoring from the upper level to the lower level of government, this
research focuses on the efficiency of these systems and takes it as a factor of “state
capacity” (Huang 1995; Edin 2003; Wang and Hu 1993). Some scholars use the
promotion-tournament theory to explain it. In reality, however, personnel promotion is
one of the most shrouded realms in Chinese government, and this obscurity limiting
the credibility and availability of the data increases the difficulty of measurement, which
caused wide divergence in the conclusions of previous research works (Li and Zhou
2005; Tao et al. 2010; Shih et al. 2012; Yao and Zhang 2013; Yang and Zheng 2013).
Second, research on limitations of accountability reveal the phenomenon of soft budget
constraints, clientelism, soft-risk constraints, adverse soft constraints, property rights of
relationship, and conspiracy (Kornai 1992; Walder 1986; Liu 2005; Zhou 2012, 2008;
Shi 2015). Although existing analyses in sociology have provided several models, the
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are still needed.
Along these discussions of authority and accountability, we have three main
objectives in this paper. First, we explore different types of authority and accountability
in Chinese hierarchies and aim to demonstrate the features of intergovernmental rela-
tionships. Revealing political imaginations in governmental studies, we can determine
the same mechanism in different concepts and analyses. For example, in the classical
federalism model, government’s main role is to provide public goods (Tiebout 1956;
Oates 1999), while in fiscal federalism, the main role of government is preserving the
market (Weingast 1995). Although they are both in favor of decentralization, the
analyses had different logical approaches. Additionally, some research assumes that the
main role of government is tax extraction (Levi 1988), which fosters analyses of the
political risk (Cao 2011; Zhou 2014). What then is the institutional environment and
internal operation logic in the Chinese government? How do these affect the
mechanism of authority and accountability in China?
The second objective of this paper is to survey formal theoretical literature on
intergovernmental relationships and advance the discussion with a new framework of
analysis. On the one hand, the subcontracting system in Chinese government hierarch-
ies provides the opportunity for competition among contractors, through which the
upper-tier government controls the lower-tier governments. On the other hand,
different from federal government and unitary governments, the structure of intergov-
ernmental authority and accountability is not transparent and symmetrical, which
invites the coexistence of a contractual system and a hierarchy system with different
management approaches of control, coordination, and incentive forms.
Finally, to illustrate our arguments, we examine the earmarked-project system. Differ-
ent from the hierarchy system, the earmarked-project system is a newly developed
organizational mechanism. Shi (2015) points out three key features of the project
system: temporality, goal-oriented operation, and flexibility. This paper explores how
the earmarked-project system operates in China, and what kind of intergovernmental
relationship it generates and aims to analyze the phenomenon of the bureaucratized-
project system.
The authority and accountability of government organizations
Government organizations differ from corporations in their multiplicity of goals, lack
of performance comparison, heterogeneity of citizens’ tastes, and dispersed ownership
(Tirole 1994). In simple-task organizations, the goal of incentives is to balance the
intensity of incentives and the degree of risk, while in organizations with multidimen-
sionality of goals, the design of the incentive system is concerned with arranging
different tasks and managing workers’ attention (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). Thus,
entirely applying the theory of firm to explain government organization may be greatly
problematic.
Researches have addressed the different goals of government, namely maximizing
social welfare (Musgrave 1959), maximizing department budget (Niskanen 1971), maxi-
mizing revenue (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Levi 1988), and maximizing monopoly
rent (Acemoglu 2002). To date, there are basically two views of government goals. First,
governments have their own interests (Evans et al. 1985), which may be distinct from
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invisible-hand model, the helping-hand model, and the grabbing-hand model, are dem-
onstrated in different legal environment and regulatory structures (Frye and Shleifer
1997). Second, the government is an agency of the people, at least in name, while the
regulator of their owners (Wilson 1989). The government extracts from citizens eco-
nomically, physically, and mentally, and in return, they receive the products of personal
security, profit safety, social equality, public order, and infrastructures (North 1981).
However, the social arrangements for distribution of income and productivity of public
goods are determined by the institutional environment and space for citizens in collect-
ive actions, a representation system, and the power of exit and voice (Hirschman 1970;
McGuire and Olson 1996). The characteristics of government organizations lie in two
dimensions: authority and accountability. The former includes governmental extraction
and production, while the latter includes institutional capacity and a structure by which
citizens can supervise their governments directly and indirectly.
Extraction and production: authority of the government
Extraction by the government
The depth of government extraction can be divided into three scales. In the small scale,
the government exercises its discretion in control of legislation and justice, and its ex-
traction capacity is limited by regulations and laws. In the medium scale, although the
budgetary system is established through non-budgetary revenues and extra-budgetary
revenues,1 the government can still collect implicit taxes, issue currency, deploy loans,
and deposits beyond the legal framework. As a result, substantially independent bu-
reaucrats pursue their own agendas and extract rent (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Frye
and Shleifer 1997). In the large scale, governments extract not only by taxation but also
by revenues and human capital. In this model, the government is a super company,
while citizens scarcely own residual claims and residual control rights to invest in hu-
man resource and economics. Consequently, this type of government impedes the in-
vestments in private sectors and reduces the extraction capacity of the government in
long term (Hayek 1945) (see Table 1).
Production of government
On the issues of governmental production, the larger the production scale the more
controversial the issue. An extreme model is the small government model in which
Adam Smith observed the government acts as a “night watchman” (Smith 2003/1776).
The so-called Washington consensus and neoliberalism were deeply influenced by
these arguments of small government. Another extreme model is called developmental
government, which follows the success of “East Asia’s Miracle”. Under this framework,
the government has embedded autonomy, which means that bureaucratic autonomy
and societal embeddedness are joined together (Evans 1995). Small governments leave
allocative decisions to the market, and the market provides positive incentives that re-
ward economic success while government regulation plays a limited role. Also, the
market provides negative incentives in terms of punishing economic failure. In this
model, the government does not impose soft budget constraints on corporations
(Weingast 1995; Kornai et al. 2003). In contrast, in the large government framework,
the government is intimately involved in promoting private economic activities. It




























































State as a super
company
Source: Adapted from World Bank 1997
Shi and Ni The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2017) 4:4 Page 5 of 21selectively supports some kinds of organizations and pursues industrial policies and
control over the market. In some cases, the government becomes the headquarters of
the market. Scholars have explored how the enhanced financial incentives of local
governments strengthen economic performance while avoiding rent seeking and
corruption (Oi 1992; Walder 1995).Monitoring and accountability of the government
Focusing on how governments exercise authority effectively, Bardhan (2002) leads us to
identify who monitors, and how elected officials carry out their responsibilities. Strikes,
appeals, and so on are negative instruments of governmental accountability, while elec-
tions and commentary can be deployed as positive instruments.
The mechanisms of accountability include first, direct participation of and voting by
the public, and second, indirect deployment of institutional devices both formally and
informally. In reality, we see a combination and coexistence of these two mechanisms.
The problem of asymmetric information exists throughout government hierarchies,
among government officials and policy makers, politicians, and bureaucrats. Thus,
monitoring by government agencies alone is not costless. This asymmetric information
problem can be solved by direct participation of the people and their attention to
administrative procedures. However, as high-level hierarchies impose sanctions, the
government in a unitary authority structure may suffer from the political costs of
wrongdoing although it can provide the benefits of administrative efficiency. Addition-
ally, the problem in the case of China is the absence of a public monitoring system.
This absence will trigger aggrieved citizens to apply methods near the boundary of au-
thorized regulations, such as collective actions and leapfrog petitions (O’ Brien 1996).
These conflicts may serve as an impediment to social development and bring about
unorganized threats to the state due to the lack of institutional capacity to settle con-
flicts within an authorized framework (Zhou 1993).
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In regard to theories of the modern state, the relationship between the people and the
government is described as a principal-agency model. In China, governmental organiza-
tions are organized as a unitary form in a simple three-tier hierarchy, with the central
government at the top, local governments in the middle, and enterprises or citizens at
the bottom. The central government issues contracts to local governments, then local
governments implement the contracts. The problem is there is no effective monitoring
system by which the public can supervise the behavior of local governments. Thus, on
the one hand, the central government empowers local governments with limited auton-
omy and appropriate incentives to utilize local advantages to fulfill the goals set by the
upper-tier government. However, it may cause incentive distorting because of abuse of
power at the central level (Baker et al. 2002). On the other hand, besides the authority
of assigning tasks to local governments, the central government is also responsible for
monitoring and supervising the lower-level governments. To sum up, these are two di-
mensions of state capacity. As is usually, the case when a subject draws advocates from
sharply different standpoints, different scholars have reached different conclusions re-
garding state capacity (Wang and Hu 1993; Wong 1992; Edin 2003).
The fundamental political dilemma of decentralization and centralization is
decentralization may balance the authorities of different bureaus in the government
and is effective in hardening budget constraints and uniting workers to commit to or-
ganizations’ long-term goals as a whole. On the other hand, the government consists of
a large number of substantially independent bureaucrats pursuing their own agendas,
including taking bribes. In extreme cases, the government becomes so disorganized that
it loses its ability to ensure laws and provide basic legal protections (Frye and Shleifer
1997). Why does decentralization galvanize the “tragedy of the commons” (Harding
1968) in some cases instead of establishing balance of authority? To answer this ques-
tion, we need to clarify the allocation mechanism of authority and accountability in
governmental organizations.The central-local framework
In China, the intergovernmental mechanism is neither federalism nor extreme central-
ism as in the Soviet Union. Our analysis suggests two main facts. First, in China, the re-
lationship between the central and local governments neither fits market-preserving
federalism in which central governments have the primary regulatory responsibility for
the economy, the lower governments face a hard budget constraint, and the common
market is ensured by the central government (Weingast 1995), nor a clear division
structure of accountability and authority between the central government and local
governments (Montinola et al. 1995). In reality, local governments have only limited
authority (the right to execute), while the central government maintains veto authority
(effective control over decisions) (Aghion and Tirole 1997). Fundamentally speaking,
local governments are self-interested and possess limited autonomy.
Second, historically and ideologically, local governments in China gained more auton-
omy compared with those under the extremely centralized government structure of the
Soviet Union. China is closer to the M-form hierarchy, while the Soviet Union to U-
form hierarchy. From the perspective of incentives, under China’s hierarchical structure
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economic development and hardened budget constraints (Maskin et al. 2000; Zhou
2007). From the perspective of coordination, functional matching between hierarchies
are vital in an M-form hierarchy, and the flexibility of this structure benefits the in-
novative experiments that otherwise have little chance to survive in the market. Yet,
this structure has been less efficient in utilizing scale economies (Qian et al. 2006). The
role of “branches” in China was less significant in the 1980s yet thrived after the tax-
share reform in the 1990s.Features of the allocation of authority and accountability in Chinese government
hierarchies
What is the allocation mechanism of intergovernmental authority and accountability in
China if neither federalism nor extreme centralism can illustrate the reality in China?
Some scholars use the theories of Federalism, Chinese Style and administrative subcon-
tracts to answer this question. However, focusing on the relationship between “blocks”
(kuaikuai), these ideal types do not capture the fundamental characteristics of the rela-
tionships among the hierarchies in Chinese governments (Qian and Xu 1993; Zhou
2014). Zhou and Lian (2012) point out the interaction and evolution of these two
models in terms of residual control but do not analyze the complicated allocation
structure of authority and accountability in Chinese hierarchies.
First, from the aspect of clarity, for federalist states, there is a clear boundary of au-
thority and accountability between the central government and local governments with
local citizens’ voting and monitoring rights (Tiebout 1956; Xu 2011). In mature central-
ism states, a clear clarification of accountability is ascribed to a clear clarification of au-
thority among different hierarchies. However, in China, the structure of authority is not
lucid, institutionally or executively (Lou 2013; Li 2010). This obscurity stems from the
organizational structure of the Chinese government. It is more than a technical prob-
lem and, as a consequence, hard to rectify. “The Organic Law of the People’s Republic
of China on the People’s Congresses and People’s Governments at All Local Levels”
stipulates that local governments should execute resolutions and decisions of the
People’s Congress and the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress at the local
level, as well as decisions and orders from the upper-tier government. This stipulation
generates a dual role for local governments. The central government can participate in
the decision-making progress of local governments indirectly through appointments,
contracts, assessment through “blocks”, and direct orders and guides from “branches”.
The clarification of authority and accountability for each block and branch is not clear,
causing disorder in the hierarchy system. This has two results. First, the central govern-
ment puts pressure on and shifts responsibilities to local governments, which will inev-
itably bring about pressure mechanisms, adverse soft budget constraints, and soft risk
constraints. Second, low-tier governments will seek extra opportunities and ask for pro-
tection from the upper-tier government and may even conspire or selectively execute
decisions to avoid punishment (Kornai 1992; Walder 1986; Rong 1998; O'Brien and Li
1999; Zhou 2005a; 2008; Liu 2005) (see Table 2).
Second, from the aspect of multiplicity, a multitask organization should theoretically
balance extraction and production institutionally. However, policies of ideology,
Table 2 The features of the authority and responsibility of China’s government organizations
Authority Accountability
Clarity Undistinguished division of branches and blocks. Can be transferred to lower-tier government;
interdependency of organizations.
Multiplicity Branches are decentralized, while blocks are
centralized.
Be responsible for the upper level Weak public
participation.
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growth as the central task during the 1980s serve as supporting examples of the unbal-
anced strategy that Hirschman (1998) describes. China’s M-form hierarchy is effective
in reducing coordination costs of the central government (Qian and Xu 1993; Qian
et al. 2006), but it is harder for the central government to supervise and coordinate
through bureaucratic structure and administrative procedures (Wong 1992). On the
other hand, to reduce these negative effects, the Chinese government relies more
on the branches (tiaotiao). However, the lack of public participation and satisfac-
tory institutional design of the branches causes competition in interests and
organization expansion (Shi 2015). This leads to territorialism, departmentalism,
and fragmentation of authoritarianism, and even worse, frustration of the national
market (Shen and Dai 1990).Contractual system or hierarchy system
Different types of contracts in the extraction and production of the government
Contracts for economic growth
Since the economic reform, China has generated significant growth by adopting policies
to “loosen and stimulate the economy” (fangkaigaohuo) and changed to a fiscal revenue
sharing system from the centralized fiscal system. Although schemes vary across prov-
inces, provincial governments enter into contracts with the central government on the
total amount or share of taxes and profits revenue to be remitted for the next several
years, and the provincial governments will keep the rest. By the late 1980s, the
provinces were keeping almost all of the marginal revenue growth (Qian and Xu 1993).
Furthermore, the extra-budgetary revenues of local governments had ballooned. In
1992, local extra-budgetary revenues went up to 110 percentage of local budgetary
revenue (Montinola et al. 1995). Thus, although a nominal tax rate was set by the cen-
tral government, local governments controlled the real tax rate through policies of tax
reduction and tax exemption for local enterprises. In addition, regional credit was
under the control of local governments before the banking system recentralized in
1998 (Oi 1992; Wong 1992; Walder 1995).2
In terms of organizational economic theories, scholars use theories of second-
generation fiscal federalism when discussing China’s intergovernmental relationships.
Similar to the function of horizontal decentralization and property rights protection, in
second-generation fiscal federalism, local governments have become almost residual
claimants to local revenue and have incentives to maximize local revenues by protect-
ing local enterprises, even when confronted by the upper-tier government regarding
their over-extraction (Montinola et al. 1995; Qian and Weingast 1997). In regard to
hierarchical structure, the lower the level of the government the greater the possibility
that local fiscal revenue is highly dependent on the profits of local enterprises, and the
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and collective enterprises that are less profitable in comparison. Moreover, with reduc-
tion of the centrally controlled capital flows, opportunity costs of paternalism for local
governments have increased because of regional competition. This horizontal competi-
tion hardened budget constraints (Qian and Roland 1998). Although the budget con-
straints have not completely hardened, it has suppressed the “grabbing hand” of the
government (Jin et al. 2005).
Nevertheless, the theory is problematic in the following two aspects. First, it does not
provide a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between local governments and
business enterprises and thus lacks a sound basis to deal with the problem of the rela-
tionship between local governments and the market. Scholars have demonstrated how
local governments utilize the positive incentive effect of the market by clarifying prop-
erty rights and have explored the issue of how local governments developed the private
sector and promoted privatization reform (Jin et al. 2005). However, according to this
fiscal incentive framework, local governments and enterprises become a community of
shared interests in government-oriented reform, and their relationship becomes more
opaque, injurious to the market’s negative incentives and to market positive incentives
in long-term.3 Second, although researchers acknowledge the outgrowth of Federalism,
Chinese Style, they have not pointed out how these internal negative results undermine
the efficiency of fiscal federalism or explored how these problems can be solved. They
merely emphasize the five preliminary requirements of market-preserving federalism
without capturing the substantial features of the Chinese government structure.
Contracts for extraction
Levi (1988) states that the level of government extraction capacity is restrained by three
conditions: the capacity of the government to control social resources and relative bar-
gaining power; the capacity of the government to formulate, coordinate, and execute
extraction contacts; and finally, the governmental expectations for the future, in other
words, the withdrawal rate. In short, governments are expected to extract resources
from their subjects without annoying them (Tirole 1994). Kiser (1994) explores two
types of tax structures—a hierarchical form employing salaried state officials and a mar-
ket form (tax farming). These frameworks of extraction have triggered controversy.
Contracts for public goods provision
As Hayek (1945) stresses controlling scale economics and externality, decentralization
of authority has the benefits of more efficient use of dispersed local knowledge pos-
sessed by the local government. Moreover, assuming unrestricted migration and abun-
dant regions, regional competition functions as market competition to provide more
satisfactory public services (Tiebout 1956). In contrast, in centralized hierarchies col-
lecting, clarifying, and disseminating information about public good preference is
costly, and along the information, channel toward the central government potential in-
formation leakage will be counterproductive to governmental decision-making pro-
gress, causing loss of control (Williamson 1967). Qian’s study (1994) indicates a greater
loss of control in a massive and complicated hierarchy system. However, this assump-
tion of regional competition does not apply to the character of the Chinese hierarchy
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der the process of public goods in quantity and quality, compared with fiscal
centralization (Qian and Roland 1998). They also point out that earmarked funds trans-
ferred from the central to local governments can play a favorable role.
Local fiscal expenditure planning is a major function of local governments, yet the
decisions on public good provision are selectively “up-side-down” (Gao 2008). On the
one hand, China has generated significant growth, even compared with developed
countries, in its communication system, industrial estate, and urban infrastructure,
which were closely related to economic performance (Zhang et al. 2007). On the
other hand, selective lack of development in more fundamental areas like public
health, education, and rural infrastructure was detrimental to China’s reform. This
situation results from local governments’ rational selection to achieve economic
growth in a multicontract system and called forth central institutional reform in
the provision of public goods.
Contracts for social equality and regional balance planning
The regional gap and the urban-rural gap have widened since the economic reform due
to the intentionally unbalanced policies of the regional contractual system (Wong
1991). Moreover, although the contractual system is easier to set up strong incentive, it
is inferior to the centralization system in solving the externality. In addition,
centralization can prevent conspiracy among local contractors (Tirole 1986).Changes and adjustments
Although the contractual system is result oriented, the restriction of contractor’s behav-
ior is limited. While the hierarchy system is process oriented, governments supervise
and monitor the entire process. In the 1980s, the rate of central expenditure and rev-
enue to total expenditure and revenue of China was rather low. Some scholars point
out that it has reached the baseline of decentralization (Wang and Hu 1993). Since
1994 and especially since 2004, the Chinese government has redesigned policies not
only in extraction institutions (separation of state and local taxation) and public goods
provision but also in economic growth mode, social order, and public security in which
the hierarchy system has played a more significant role. The emergence of the new
mobilization form of “leading group” (lingdao xiaozu) and “project headquarters”
(zhihuibu), along with the new organizational form of the “province-administrated
county” and the “fiscal-administrated county”, has brought about an alteration in the
intergovernmental authority and accountability mechanism.
Furthermore, the mechanism of authority and accountability varies among regions
and government organizations. Enjoying preferential policies, some regions are assigned
special economic or political functions in the reform while others not (Yang 1990). For
instance, in economic terms, the southeastern coastal regions, which enjoyed superior
factor endowments, are empowered with more institutional flexibility by the central
government compared to the interior. Although regional policies may be unconstitu-
tional in some other countries, they are a crucial part of the Chinese institutional
structure and influence the contractual systems and authority-accountability mechan-
ism in different regions.
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The efficiency of authority lies in accountability. Two modes monitor and assess the
output. First, the process-oriented mechanism is implemented when monitoring is
observable or cooperation is valued over competition. This accountability mode is
based on individual behavior in the decision-making progress, yet the costs of monitor-
ing remain high. The second method is the outcome-oriented mechanism, which can
be divided into absolute-performance and relative-performance evaluations. Given that
the latter can alter incentive levels in different situations, the relative performance
evaluation gains more flexibility. However, the agents share risks while enjoying profits
and risk aversion hastens incentive distorting, which must be balanced (Lazear and
Rosen 1981).
The Chinese government system combines these two mechanisms. By comparing
relative performance of contractors, the central government controls personnel incen-
tives and material incentives due to economic and social development policies that
mainly depend on the contractual system. Meanwhile, competition among lower-tier
governments lends credibility to the upper-tier government. The upper-tier government
thus remains highly authoritative (Bendor et al. 1987). In addition, governance by pro-
cedural rules and regulations became increasingly significant in the Chinese govern-
ment system. As the result of the abovementioned features of Chinese governance, one
way to solve this dichotomy of progress and output of policy monitoring is by factions
(Dittmer and Wu 1995). Faction members share group solidarity in ideology and gen-
eral ideas. Factions can be used to promote different sets of goals. The most prominent
areas are security, material interests, and ideological and policy commitments. The
consensus in factions provides stability, compatibility, and flexibility, and it partly solves
the authorization problem of the contractual system (Whyte 1973).4 This phenomenon
challenges the theories of developmental government and rank-order tournaments.Promotion: economic-oriented tournaments?
In multitask organizations, the incentives are “low-powered” (Holmstrom and Milgrom
1991). “High-powered” relative performance incentives are suitable for lower-level em-
ployees with simple tasks rather than higher-level employees who have multitasks.
Many research works focus on political elites in the Chinese government; although rea-
sonable, this focus leaves many problems unaddressed.
Maskin et al. (2000) has illustrated that the economic status of one province has a
positive correlation with province’s status in the Central Committee, and regional com-
petition determines the status. Some scholars then applied this theory to individual offi-
cials. Based on the theories of tournaments and yardstick competition (Lazear and
Rosen 1981; Shleifer 1985), they argue that GDP-growth-order tournaments existed in
the promotion of local officials (Zhou 2004, 2007; Li and Zhou 2005; Chen et al. 2005).
The premises of promotion tournaments in China are central control of the
personnel system, preventing conspiracy, measurable indexes for tournaments,
controlling power over local economic by local government leaders and individual
performance assessment, effective promotion commitment, and analogy among re-
gions under deep M-form.5 Scholars carried out statistical research on these topics
(Li and Zhou 2005; Zhou 2005b; Chen et al. 2005; Du et al. 2012).
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for measurement and finds that local economic growth has no relevance to the promo-
tion of officials. Zhou (2004) argues that political tournaments will bring about local
protectionism and barricade regional cooperation but tests of this argument have not
brought statistically significant results (Chen et al. 2005). In addition, some scholars
consider economic scale as a more fundamental element in promotion incentives (Bo
1996; Yang and Zheng 2013; Yao and Zhang 2013).
In this literature on promotion incentives in the Chinese government, the problem of
endogeneity has not been addressed seriously or formally analyzed. What is significant
in the promotion of government officials if they are sent to a more economically
developed region as a result rather than a reason? Some researchers turned to non-
economic factors like factional ties. Shih et al. (2012) explores the advancement of
Central Committee members in China but fails to find evidence that exceptional
economic growth contributes to high ranking in the party hierarchy. Their findings
suggest that factional ties with various top leaders boost the chance of climbing into
the upper echelons of the CCP.Implications
These discussions about political tournaments have not systematically analyzed the
mechanism of promotion and incentive in Chinese government hierarchies with respect
to authority and accountability. First, from the perspective of designing an incentive
system, it is more than a system of indexes. Diversity of authority and accountability
will cause incentive distorting even in a “big government” like China, if only by some
so-called objective indexes and ranks. Rational decision makers see this problem. Intro-
ducing subjective performance measures and explicit incentive contracts can mitigate
incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. In some circumstances,
objective and subjective measures are complements (Baker et al. 1994). From the man-
agement perspective, it is suspicious that a candidate who can fill the current position
would also be eligible for a higher position. This is the reason why members of organi-
zations spend considerable time, effort, and ingenuity to influence decision makers
(Rosen 1982; Milgrom and Roberts 1988). Furthermore, the position for officials of
each level in the government hierarchy system after promotion may not be economic-
ally oriented. Finally, loyalty is a fundamental aspect in institutional system designing
for any organization; it is essential in the incentive system.
Second, analyzing the nature of authority can also help us explore this issue. Sup-
porters of the tournament model point out that the central government holds central-
ized control of personnel promotion. Now that the central government has this
centralized authority, why would it restrain itself by some fixed indexes? Blau (1963)
presents the relationship between authority and indexes: on the one hand, decision
makers use numbers as a way to offer incentives and a way to increase their credibility
and avoid disputes. On the other hand, these upper-tier officials are not manipulated
by numbers. In addition, the tournament model addresses the idea that promotion is
an effective commitment because it will not occupy extra resources, and the system
needs to eventually find someone who is qualified for the position. However, these ar-
guments lack awareness of the uncertainty that exists in the process of government
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organization (March 1962; Rajan and Zingales 1998); otherwise, the phenomenon that
Montinola presents cannot be explained: because of fiscal incentives, many local
officials in developed regions do not pursue advancement because they have more
autonomy and possibility of monetary profit in their original position (Montinola et al.
1995). One explanation of this phenomenon is the diversity of individuals, indicating
that officials in bureaucracy have different goals (Downs 1967). Another explanation is
power; Zhou (2016) uses the concept of stratified mobility to explore this problem.Projects sponsored by the central government: a preliminary framework
Previous studies of the project system mainly focused on the hierarchical operation
(She and Chen 2011; Zhou 2012a, 2012b; Qu 2012; Huang et al. 2014). Scholars seldom
approach the problem by applying organizational theories (Shi 2015). To illustrate our
arguments, we reconsider the project system from the organizational perspective.The earmarked project system in a multiple governmental authority and accountability
system
After the tax-sharing reform, central fiscal revenue was transferred down to local gov-
ernments in three forms: tax rebates, general-purpose transfer payments, and special
purpose transfer payments.6 The three are designed for different goals and correspond-
ingly have different intergovernmental authority-accountability features. First, the form
of tax rebates is designed to encourage local tax extraction, and the main goal of tax re-
bates is to balance resistance to the economic reform, especially from developed re-
gions in eastern China. Thus, tax rebates have an unfair effect. In the early years of the
reform, tax rebates increased to almost 80% of government expenditures, while it
remained at the rate of 50% before 2000, and the majority went to developed regions.
Second, the general-purpose transfer payment was designed to balance expenditure
gaps among regions, and it contributed the political effect of achieving social equality
and maintaining social stability (Treisman 1999; Wang 2002). The majority of these
funds flowed to the western or frontier areas, minority regions, rural areas, and impo-
verished areas. Third, the form of special transfer payments is unique in its purpose,
special distribution mechanism, and practical results. According to economic analyses,
special transfer payments are a modification for externality through subsidies to re-
gional marginal revenue and altering relative prices to solve the financial shortage of
public goods, especially goods that have strong externality. However, scholars have
pointed out that the function of special transfer payments works by political logic (Dixit
and Londregan 1998). The profit of special transfer payments belongs to specific re-
gions while the national fiscal system bears the costs; thus, local government may over-
apply for special transfer payments. The distributors of special transfer payments make
decisions politically rather than economically, so there are a considerable number of in-
efficient projects (Weingast et al. 1981).
In China, the ratio of central fiscal expenditures to government expenditures was
rather low, fluctuating at the rate of 20%, which was one of the lowest in the world (Li
2010; Lou 2013). In 2014, the national general public budget expenditure was around
15.18 trillion RMB. The central-level general public budget expenditure was about 2.26
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government was approximately 5.16 trillion RMB, accounting for 33.99%, which
accounted for 48.86% of the annual central level budget expenditure as a whole (see
Table 3). According to these numbers, China is not unique. In other words, the particu-
larity of Chinese fiscal expenditure system lies in its fiscal structure in which the rate of
indirect expenditure from the central government is rather high. This led to ambiguity
in intergovernmental authority-accountability relationships.
As illustrated in the fiscal expenditure categories, national defense expenditures and
science and technology development expenditures were the responsibility of the central
governments. Except for expenditures in public security, the expenditures in other cat-
egories went downward, flowing to local governments through earmarked transfer pay-
ments. The expenditures in health care, social security, and employment were
transferred down to local governments, while their counterparts in other countries like
the USA are direct expenditures of the central government (see Fig. 1).
The rate of tax rebates to annual central expenditures declined over the years, and it
was the highest among the three types of central expenditures until 2005 (see Table 4
and Fig. 2). Tsui (2005) observes that in those years, fiscal inequality among regions
was aggravated by the tax rebates and transfer payments. Then, from 2008 to 2010,
special transfer payments occupied the highest proportion, reaching 43.6% in 2010.
After this period, general transfer payments occupied the greatest proportion, and in
2014, the rate went up to 53.4%. We can thus almost conclude that intergovernmental
relationships have changed since 2011 because the superficiality of these numbers cast
doubt on this conclusion. The central government earmarked 262.22 million RMB of
central general expenditures in 2011. In the two types of central transfer payments, up
to 61.7% of the funds were earmarked, which means local governments had no auton-








Farming, forestry, and water conservancy 6474.26 539.67 5934.59
Health and family planning 2931.26 90.25 2841.01
Social security and employment 7066.11 699.91 6366.20
Education 4101.59 1253.62 2847.97
Science and technology 2541.81 2436.66 105.15
Public security 2120.27 1477.76 642.51
National defense 8082.88 8055.14 27.74
Energy conservation and environmental protection 2033.03 344.74 1688.29
Communication and transportation 4269.79 731.16 3538.63
Housing security 2529.78 405.41 2124.37
Tax rebates 5081.55 0 5081.55
General transfer payments 18379.88 0 18379.88
Total expenditures 74161.11 22570.07 51591.04
Source: Lou, Jiwei 2014
Note: Although the tax rebates and general transfer payments are listed, the total amount of 2014’s general transfer
payments is 2756.837 billion RMB, which is higher than the amount listed here. The local level expenditure of subitems
(farming, forestry, water conservancy, national defense, etc.) refers to expenditures through earmarked projects and
other types
Fig. 1 Expenditure structure of central fiscal budget of China (2014)
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(Liu 2014). Additionally, some basic expenditures of the central government budget
were also earmarked as project funds.Organizational features of the earmarked project system
In China, general transfer payments and special transfer payments are two different
contractual types. The former flows down through blocks, which are based on a stand-
ard structure of government hierarchies, while the latter is transferred down through
branches that are decentralized and flexible. There are two characteristics of the con-
tractual system: first, the compulsory homologous structures (Zhu and Zhang 2005) inTable 4 The Scale and Percentage of Three Kinds of Local Subsidies
General (Financial) Transfer Payments Earmarked Funds Tax Rebates
Billion RMB % Billion RMB % Billion RMB %
2003 191.4 23.2 259.8 31.4 374.9 45.4
2004 260.5 25.0 342.3 32.9 438.0 42.1
2005 381.2 33.2 352.9 30.7 414.3 36.1
2006 473.2 35.1 441.2 32.7 434.7 32.2
2007 709.3 39.2 689.8 38.1 412.1 22.7
2008 874.6 38.0 996.2 43.3 428.2 18.7
2009 1131.7 39.6 1236.0 43.3 488.7 17.1
2010 1323.6 40.9 1411.2 43.6 499.3 15.5
2011 1831.1 45.9 1657.0 41.5 504.0 12.6
2012 2147.1 47.3 1879.2 41.4 512.1 11.3
2013 2436.3 50.7 1861.0 38.7 504.7 10.6
2014 2756.8 53.4 1894.1 36.7 508.1 9.9
Source: Year 2003–2005, Zhou Feizhou, 2012; Year 2006–2014, Finance Yearbook of China, also
see http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengshuju
Fig. 2 The structrue of central expenditure to local level (2003–2014)
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second, in the official definition, special transfer payments are used for projects
commissioned by the central government and central-local collective projects, and they
share the features of the contractual system and regional competition.
First, from the view of horizontal relationships, the earmarked project system
increases competition among central ministries. The balance between government or-
ganizations is essential in hardening budget constraints and increasing governmental
decision quality. However, in China, the absence of an efficient supervision mechanism
leads to decentralized and unorganized expansion of these departments. Every
department aims to have more projects and expand their authority in projects. The
National Audit Office of PRC addresses this phenomenon as “fragmentation and
departmentalization” (Liu 2014). As an example, projects in agriculture, forestry, and
water resources are under the control of the National Development and Reform Com-
mission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Land and Resources, Ministry of Science and
Technology, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Water Resources, State Forestry
Administration, Office of State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters, China
Meteorological Administration, The State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty
Alleviation and Development, State Administration of Grain, Federation of Supply and
Marketing Cooperatives, Ministry of Education, National Health and Family Planning
Commission, Ministry of Culture, and Ministry of Civil Affairs at the central level.
These ministries create special departments unrelated to their original functions for these
projects. Thus, ministries have no incentive to monitor and supervise themselves by their
own authority. To sum up, the Chinese government is neither an M-form organization
because of centralized authority among branches nor a U-form organization because of
the disordered division, even antidivision, among central ministries.
Second, from the view of vertical relationships of government organizations, the ear-
marked project system causes interdependency in the multilevel hierarchies. Different
from central-local relationships in other countries (Dixit and Londregan 1998),
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expand project funds, while the upper-tier government relies on the local governments
to strive for more fiscal budget from projects and gain more authority in these projects.
In addition, the indistinct authority and accountability relationship among projects
gives rise to a symbiotic relationship between upper and lower hierarchies. Conspiracy
between upper and lower governments is one result. Therefore, in the monitoring and
supervision of projects, even the problems of misuse of funds and low quality of prod-
ucts will not be punished by upper-tier governments. This unsubstantial supervision
softens budget constraints. Furthermore, to achieve better performance, central and
local governments prefer to highlight certain projects. Despite the lack of perfect com-
petition, the preference for particular projects galvanizes long-term factions between
hierarchies, establishing an informal relationship within formal hierarchies. This leads
to the “Matthew Effect” (She and Chen 2011). This relationship among hierarchies is a
way to soften budget constraints rather than the result of it.Discussion
Government organization is an interdisciplinary topic, and many theories contribute to
the discussion, especially in economics and sociology. These years have witnessed an
increased interaction among different subjects. For instance, economists have become
more valued in the research in sociology, political science, and psychology. Sociological
studies should focus on rising new concepts rather than answering the questions that
previous theories have not explained.
The studies on the “campaign government” of China epitomized these phenomena.
Scholars give different definitions and explanations on the basis of different literature
(Feng 2011; Zhou 2012; Zhou 2014). However, they do not logically point out the pre-
conditions of their mechanism and thus have lost connection with basic theories. Why
did the Chinese government operate more by means of campaigns even compared with
socialist counterparts, such as the traditional Soviet Union? Why are national cam-
paigns in China designed to achieve one goal rather than several goals? Why is this
campaign mechanism more flat than other mechanisms? We can try to answer these
questions with three hypotheses. First, the prevailing theories on campaigns indicate
the weakness of the traditional hierarchy system. Compared with the centralized U-
form hierarchy of the Soviet Union, China’s M-form hierarchy remains decentralized
with a lower level of specialization and professionalization. These features of govern-
ment structure may give rise to national campaigns. Second, organizations have differ-
ent goals and tasks, and they go into different orders in different levels of hierarchies.
A national campaign mandatorily unifies the orders nationwide. Thus, on the basis of
the first hypothesis, governments under pressure to catch up to developed countries
tend to deploy this national campaign. The movements of the iron and steel industry
to catch up with Britain and America help illustrate this phenomenon. Third, in
certain conditions, the hierarchy chain and range of control are substitutable (Qian
1994; Hart and Moore 2005). Thus, campaign mechanism shortens hierarchy
chains with direct communication from upper to lower governments, and central
control is widened. This is particularly applicable for some urgent tasks and
projects.
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government to institutionalize change in society. Kornai’s (1992) concepts such as soft
budget constraints, investment hunger, and mandatory increase remain convincing and
applicable with slight changes. This is a warning for our social scientists: how will the
theories remain popular in these years of intense change? Thus, to illustrate the mech-
anism of realities, clarifying the boundaries is more significant than updating concepts.Endnotes
1Extra-budgetary revenues and non-budgetary revenues are not in the category of
budget revenue in China. Although the Chinese government issued “Decisions on
Extra-budgetary Revenues Regulations” in 1996, clauses in these regulations were not
detailed or specified. In addition, there are no formal regulations for non-budgetary
revenue, making it difficult to supervise and control.
2As far as it is concerned, the criticism by Cai and Treisman (2006) are weakened.
They argue that although the marginal fiscal retention rate of government has in-
creased, the proportion of fiscal revenue to national income has declined. By using sim-
ple multiplication, they came to the conclusion that the rate at which the fiscal revenue
of local government can control to the whole local fiscal revenue has dwindled.
3Some scholars even view a township or village as a corporation, and the government
of the township as the board of directors and the management team of the corporation.
Under fiscal incentives, local governments support the reproduction of enterprises in-
stead of corruption with revenue they gain from these enterprises (Oi 1992). However,
the effect of this selective paternalism is unclear and differs by region.
4Vertical protection is pivotal in the inner structure of factions (Walder 1986). This
protection system from the upper-tier in China is contrary to rule-based governance.
5It is difficult to fulfill these premises. The term “tournaments” was originally
used in sport events, with fewer participants and more clarity of the indexes.
Admittedly, some indexes before the economic reforms such as steel production
and grain output fit the premises (Zhou 2009). In addition, China implicated re-
gional development policy with regions differing in the policy priority, and the
upper-tier government has the controlling power to orientate the regional function,
index of land use, and credit policies.
6The names and ranges of central expenditure have changed over the years see Li
(2010) for a discussion of this issue.Acknowledgements
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